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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relationship between immigrant-composition and wages 
of different occupations and different industries in Canada. It reports the effects of 
change in proportion of immigrants on the wage level in 1996 for both male and female 
Canadians and immigrants. First all immigrants are considered homogeneous and 
thereafter they are distinguished according to a wide array of criterion and a full 
spectrum of results are presented. These results suggest that for immigrants the 
aggregate relationship of income with immigrant composition is fairly small, unless they 
are subcategorised into specific groups (e.g. non-white immigrants, immigration after 
1990). The corresponding wage penalties for Canadians are more uniform across the 
different subgroup specifications and decomposition of the data. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
While there is a large literature documenting the gender wage gap and 
occupational segregation based on sex, similar comparisons between Canadians by birth 
(henceforth Canadians) and Canadians by naturalisation (immigrants hereafter) are not 
that common. If the jobs in which immigrants participate the most are called ‘immigrant 
jobs’ and if there are systematic lower wages in ‘immigrant jobs’, it looms to be 
problem. It is also important to examine if there is any negative effect of the 
‘immigrantness’ of occupations or industries on wages. An investigation of the latest 
available Canadian data will widen the empirical perspective and bring a new set of facts 
to support or refute theories about wages in ‘immigrant jobs’. 
Over the years literatures that have helped establish theories about wage 
differentials and occupational segregation can be divided into three major categories. 
First, studies on wage differentials based on gender/sex. Crucial studies on this topic 
have been performed by Baker, Benjamin, Desaulniers, and Grant (1993); Doiron and 
Riddell (1994); Drolet (1999); Filmore (1990), to name a few. Second, gender based 
occupational segregation, or as some of the researchers prefer to call it, occupational 
‘femaleness’ and wage differentials. Leading Canadian studies on this issue have been 
carried out by Baker and Fortin (2001), Macpherson and Hirsch (1995), Baker and 
Fortin (2000 – comparing USA and Canada). If there are two major groups competing in 
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the labour force and one is a dominant group, interests build up to see how the lesser 
group is faring against them. This paves the way for our third category, where 
economists compare immigrants against the natives, similar to their comparison of 
women against men. Notable Canadian studies on wage differentials based on 
immigration status have been conducted by Baker and Benjamin (1994); Bloom, 
Grenier, and Gunderson (1995); De Silva (1992); Hum and Simpson (2004); Chiswick 
and Miller (2003). 
This brings us to the related, in addition to being important, issue of occupational 
‘immigrantness’ and wage differentials in Canada, relevant studies on which are not 
found. Therefore, it seems important to examine the relationship between immigrant-
composition and wages of different occupations in Canada. Assessing the same 
relationship for different industries will help us crosscheck our findings, among which 
one important one is the answer to the suspicion of whether immigrants are getting 
clustered into any particular occupations or industries; and if so, are those the low-
paying categories. In addition, we will also revisit some longstanding issues such as 
whether immigrants from developed countries perform better than immigrants from 
developing countries, whether or not the age of immigration the affects economic 
performance of immigrants, and how long it takes for immigrants’ income to converge 
with that of Canadians. 
In this paper we attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of the mid 1990s – 
1996 to be exact, because that is the latest census data available – of the relationship 
between immigration-based occupational and industrial segregation and wages in 
Canada. We document the sensitivity of our estimates to various estimation strategies 
used in the literature and to the specification of the additional conditioning variables. In 
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the 1996 census data occupations have been divided into 25 categories and industries 
have been divided into 16 categories. We examine the effects of change in proportion of 
immigrants on the wage level based on occupations and industries separately. Separate 
estimates of the status of ‘immigrant jobs’ will be presented across workers 
distinguished by marital status, number of dependent children, visible minority status, as 
well as other demographic, sectoral and individual characteristics. 
First, we assume that all immigrants are homogeneous and present our results. 
Thereafter, we distinguish among immigrants according to a wide array of criterion and 
present our estimates for immigrants and Canadians by different groupings to provide a 
full spectrum of results. Immigrants that were born outside Canada, United States or 
Europe are grouped together against the rest of the labour force (including immigrants 
from Europe and the United States). We also categorise immigrants who entered Canada 
after 1980 against the rest of the labour force (including immigrants who came prior to 
1980) and do the same for immigrants who arrived after 1990. Finally, we attempt to 
investigate if there is any effect of immigrants coming in earlier or latter days of their 
lives. We assemble immigrants who migrated to Canada after age 12 against the rest of 
the labour force. Similarly, we categorise immigrants who migrated after 19, 24, 29, and 
39. 
Our estimates of the wage penalty in ‘immigrant jobs’ provide, by some 
measures, an upper bound on the potential benefits of any pay equity initiative to bridge 
any existing disparity between immigrants and Canadians.  Therefore, the analysis this 
paper offers can serve as a baseline for future work in this area. 
Analysis at finer levels of aggregation reveals some heterogeneity in the penalty 
across groups. In narrower specifications, immigrants who originated from places other 
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than Europe and the United States face significant penalties to working in immigrant 
jobs relative to co-workers in Canadian jobs. Larger negative penalties are also found for 
immigrants who have not been in Canada for a very significant period of time. 
Immigrants who enter Canada at an older age face massive penalties to working in 
immigrant jobs. Immigration at an earlier age reduces this penalty considerably and 
childhood immigration almost dissolves any penalty to be had. The corresponding 
penalties for Canadians are more uniform across the different subgroup specifications 
and decomposition of the data. 
Our results suggest that for immigrants the aggregate relationship of income with 
immigrant composition is fairly small, unless they are subcategorised into specific 
groups (e.g. non-white immigrants, immigration after 1990). A simulation of the 
contribution of occupational and industrial immigrant segregation to the aggregate 
immigrant wage differential is correspondingly quite modest. 
In section 2 we discuss the existing literatures on immigrants’ economic 
performance over the years. This section is divided into two sections: 1) Canadian 
studies, and 2) Studies in other countries.  
In section 3 we present the description of the data and their salient features. We 
also provide an overview of the immigration composition of occupational and industrial 
categories and its consequences for wages in Canada for all applicable groups. 
In section 4 we outline our econometric strategy for estimating the correlation of 
occupational, as well as industrial, immigration composition and wages in the presence 
of grouped data. 
In section 5 we present the results and examine the relationship between the 
wage ‘penalties’ in ‘immigrant jobs’ and the immigration-based wage gap. 
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In section 6 we summarise our findings and conclude with possible policy 
implications and scope for extension of this topic in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
 A number of researchers have studied various economic issues related to 
immigrants and immigration. In this section we study some of the prominent Canadian 
immigration literatures as well as literatures from around the world.  
2. A. Canadian Studies 
For Canada, there have been some studies of trends in immigrant earnings using 
few or no controls (Canada. Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1998; Ruddick 1999), 
studies estimating the time elapsed before the convergence of the earnings of immigrants 
and the native born (Bloom, Grenier and Gunderson 1995), and studies estimating the 
effect of entry-class composition on the differential between the earnings of immigrants 
and those of the native-born (Wright and Maxim 1993). 
 There are studies that evaluated the extent to which (1) the earnings of 
immigrants at the time of immigration fall short of the earnings of comparable 
Canadian-born individuals, (2) immigrants’ earnings grow more rapidly over time than 
those of Canadian born, and (3) assimilation of immigrants’ earnings vary in the labour 
market according to their gender and country of origin. 
Another important topic that has been covered in the literature extensively is the 
reasons that had contributed to declines in the relative economic position of immigrants 
in Canada. In a related note, some researchers studied the inherent differences – both 
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observed and unobserved, including those related to the interruption of labour market 
activity and earning capacity – between Canadians and immigrants that lead to earning 
differences between these two groups. 
There are studies that have addressed the issue of the effectiveness of the 
immigrant selection system, and in so doing, have provided indirect evidence on the 
economic adjustment of immigrant classes. Comparisons of the performance of 
immigrants in Canada and the United States also exist in the literature.  
Researchers have looked at the effects of changes in Canadian immigration policy 
on the occupational composition of immigrants. Another issue that emerged in the 
literature is the point system used to screen immigration applicants and its effects on 
entry earnings of newly arrived immigrants. Also available are analysis of the effects of 
language practice on earnings among adult male immigrants in Canada. 
Economic performance of the refugee class immigrants has been the source of 
significant speculation and studies are found that estimated the time required for 
refugees’ earnings to converge with those of the independent class. 
Baker and Benjamin (1994) examined the economic assimilation of immigrants 
to Canada using 1971, 1981 and 1986 census microdata files. They found that entry 
earnings were falling across successive immigrant cohorts, while their rates of 
assimilation are uniformly small. They revealed that immigrant and Canadian earnings 
profiles were becoming more dispersed. Recent immigrants started with earnings up to 
20% lower than their predecessors and had assimilated at a very modest pace in their 
early years in Canada. If their future assimilation matched that of earlier cohorts, 
convergence with natives was to be unattainable. They found relatively robust estimates 
of significant and permanent differences across arrival cohorts to Canada, though their 
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identity was much less clear. The questions they found unanswered were these: Had the 
occupational composition of immigrant employment changed over time? Were they 
increasingly concentrated in a growing pool of “bad” jobs? Had trends from high-paying 
manufacturing jobs towards lower-paying service occupations disproportionately 
affected the immigrant population? Also, a growing proportion of immigrants were so 
called visible minorities, and discrimination could not be ruled out. 
Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson (1995) used pooled 1971, 1981, and 1986 
Canadian census data to evaluate the extent to which (1) the earnings of Canadian 
immigrants at the time of immigration fall short of the earnings of comparable 
Canadian-born individuals, and (2) immigrants’ earnings grow more rapidly over time 
than those of Canadian born. Variations in the labour market assimilation of immigrants 
according to their gender and country of origin are also analysed. The results suggested 
that recent immigrant cohorts have had more difficulty being assimilated into the 
Canadian labour market than earlier ones, an apparent consequence of then recent 
changes in Canadian immigration policy, labour market discrimination against visible 
minorities, and the prolonged recession of the early 1980s. Their analysis suggested that 
the Canadian labour market had not been able easily to assimilate more recent cohorts of 
immigrants given the changing nature of such immigration. Prior to 1965 complete 
assimilation within 15 years was the norm for both men and women regardless of region 
of origin. Thereafter, assimilation took longer and longer, with complete assimilation 
appearing completely out of reach for post-1970 immigrants. Assimilation had been 
particularly slow for immigrant men from Asia, Africa, and Latin America compared 
with those from Europe and the United States. Their results suggested that three major 
factors have contributed to the decline in immigrant assimilation, namely: 
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1. Reduced immigrant “quality” because of changing immigration policies; 
2. Increased discrimination as the composition of immigrants changed towards       
visible minorities; and 
3. Reduced absorptive capacity of the labour market, especially for less skilled groups, 
possibly reflecting the effect of prolonged recession. 
De Silva (1992) provided evidence from the 1981 census indicating that there 
was little discrimination against immigrants purely on the basis of colour. In any event, 
increased discrimination could not be the full explanation for disparity, because the 
decline in assimilation occurred for immigrants from Europe and the United States as 
well as for visible minorities from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Neither can 
“quality” changes (stemming from immigration policy) provide a full explanation, 
because assimilation deteriorated markedly in the early 1980s, and yet immigration 
policy did not change significantly at that time. At that stage it appeared that all three 
factors – immigration policy, discrimination, and macroeconomic forces – had 
contributed to declines in the relative economic position of Canadian immigrants. 
  Hum and Simpson (2004) suggested that immigrants differ from the native born 
in terms of unobserved factors, such as motivation; and observed factors, including those 
related to the interruption of labour market activity and earning capacity, which may 
bias estimates of immigrant integration. Using panel data from the Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics (SLID), they showed that using potential experience, rather than 
actual experience, exaggerates estimates of the disruption and recovery caused by 
immigration. Their results suggested that immigrants themselves never catch up to 
otherwise comparable native born workers, but that their children do just as well. These 
results were consistent with the omission of a variable such as motivation that is stronger 
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for immigrants than the native born and that is partially inherited by succeeding 
generations.   
 Chiswick and Miller (2003) analyzed the effects of language practice on earnings 
among adult male immigrants in Canada using the 1991 census. Earnings were shown to 
increase with schooling, pre-immigration experience and duration in Canada, as well as 
with proficiency in the official languages (English and French). Using selectivity 
correction techniques, it was shown that there is complementarity between language 
skills and both schooling and pre-immigration experience. That is, greater proficiency in 
the official languages enhances the effects on earnings of schooling and pre-immigration 
labour market experience. Language proficiency and post-migration experience appear 
to be substitutes, that is, those with greater proficiency have a smaller effect of time in 
Canada on earnings. 
Their study showed that language skills are a key determinant of earnings among 
immigrants in Canada. Immigrants who cannot conduct a conversation in an official 
language and those who, while being able to conduct a conversation in an official 
language, usually speak a nonofficial language at home, have earnings around 10 to 12% 
lower than immigrants who usually speak an official language at home, when other 
variables are the same. The earnings gap is larger, 12–14%, among those who completed 
their schooling prior to immigrating. 
There was evidence of positive selection into the group that can conduct a 
conversation in an official language, but who usually speak a non-official language at 
home. The increment in earnings associated with an additional year of education is 5% 
among immigrants who usually speak an official language at home, around 3% for those 
who can conduct a conversation in an official language who usually speak a non-official 
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language at home, and zero for immigrants who cannot conduct a conversation in an 
official language. When evaluated at 10 years, the impact of pre-immigration experience 
for these three groups is around 2%, 1% and zero, respectively, while the impact of 
duration of residence in Canada for the three groups is around 1, 2 and 2.5%, 
respectively. The analysis of immigrant earnings presented in this paper has implications 
for immigration policy and absorption policy. An immigration policy that screens 
immigrants, in part, by their official language skills would result in higher earnings 
among the foreign born. An immigrant absorption policy that promotes investments in 
official language skills after migration and using these skills in the labour market and at 
home can enhance the value of the skills immigrants bring with them and hence the 
economic well-being of immigrants. 
Green and Worswick (2002) found that while native born new entrants have 
experienced substantial declines in earnings across labour market entry cohorts, the 
cross–cohort declines for immigrants have been even greater. Returns to foreign 
experience in all education groups have gone from being significant and positive for the 
1980–82 entry cohorts to insignificant and even, at times, negative for the 1990s entry 
cohorts. About half of these declines in returns to foreign experience can be attributed to 
a shift in the source country composition of the inflow away from countries from which 
we expect it would be easy to transfer human capital. The remainder is due to declines in 
returns to foreign experience even within country groups. The entire decline in 
immigrant entry earnings over the 1980s can virtually be explained by a combination of 
general falls in new entrant earnings, shifts in the source country composition and falls 
in returns to foreign experience. For the entire period (i.e., from the early 1980s to the 
mid to late 1990s), these factors account for about 80% of the overall decline with about 
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40% being attributed to general new entrant effects while source country and returns to 
foreign experience effects account for 20% each. For immigrants of all age and 
education groups, in general declines in entry earnings have been matched with a rise in 
returns to Canadian experience. Taken together, these results suggest that a large part of 
the decline in entry earnings for immigrants can be attributed to forces that are affecting 
all labour market entrants and thus might not be the direct purview of immigration 
policy. Much of the remaining relative decline appears to stem from an evaporation of 
the returns to foreign experience. However, this latter effect is offset by increases in 
earnings growth after arrival. Together, these suggest that more recent immigrants have 
greater difficulty transferring their post–schooling acquired human capital but that the 
transfer may ultimately happen. The issue then becomes whether and how such a 
transfer can be sped up. 
Reitz (2001) has documented an 11% fall in entry earnings for immigrant men 
arriving in the five years before the 1991 Census as compared to those arriving within a 
similar span before the 1981 Census. As bad as this is, the 1990s are even worse: entry 
earnings for those arriving in the five years before the 1996 Census are 10% worse than 
for those arriving just before the 1991 Census. The earnings patterns for Canadian 
immigrants in the 1980s are well documented (e.g., Baker and Benjamin (1994) and 
Grant (1999)) but we know little about why the outcomes have been so much worse in 
the 1990s.  
The fact that the 1980s cohorts fell behind earlier cohorts has been documented 
extensively in the literature. The fact that the 1990s entry cohorts have even lower entry 
earnings is also known, but the finding that these latter cohorts are actually on a path to 
catch up better is relatively new. The results also match those for the US, where declines 
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in entry earnings across cohorts have been the source of considerable debate since it was 
first identified by Borjas (1985). 
There are a few other Canadian studies that have addressed the issue of the 
effectiveness of the immigrant selection system, and in so doing, have provided indirect 
evidence on the economic adjustment of immigrant classes. For example, Duleep and 
Regets (1992) tried to examine whether the Canadian immigrant selection system, which 
places heavy emphasis on economic criteria is more effective than the US immigration 
system, which is largely based on family reunification, by comparing the experience of 
immigrants in the two countries. The study looked only at immigrants from Asia and 
Europe, using the 1980 US census and the 1981 Canadian census. The authors found 
that although immigrants to Canada were younger at the time of arrival and reported 
greater language proficiency than those who entered the United States, this did not 
necessarily translate into an advantage in terms of education and earnings, once they 
controlled for observable characteristics. In other words, immigrants admitted for 
reasons of family reunification were found to do as well as those admitted on economic 
grounds. Hence the authors concluded that the Canadian immigrant selection system is 
no more effective than the US system. 
However, as Green and Green (1995) have argued, the above conclusion may be 
somewhat premature because the study is based on a single census for each country and 
therefore, is unlikely to capture the effect of different policy regimes on immigrant 
performance.  
Borjas (1993) also made a comparison of the performance of immigrants in 
Canada and the United States. However, unlike Duleep and Regets, his analysis dealt 
with immigrants from all countries and was based on pooled data from two census years. 
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He found that immigrants to Canada were somewhat more educated and had higher 
entry earnings than those coming to the US, which in turn was interpreted as evidence 
that immigrants admitted on economic grounds tend to be more successful than those 
admitted for family-based reasons. 
More recently, Green and Green (1995) and Green (1995) have looked at the 
effects of changes in Canadian immigration policy on the occupational composition of 
immigrants. Their main focus was on the 1967 changes to the Immigration Act which 
ushered in a regulatory system, including the points system. They found that the points 
system contributed to a shift in the occupational composition from less skilled categories 
such as labourers toward professionals. Despite this, the authors argued that the 
effectiveness of the points system was limited because of the large number of other 
characteristics the points system sought to control.  
Wanner (2003) estimated models predicting log earnings from the entry class 
composition of each entry cohort by country of birth and its interaction with years since 
arrival controlling for other characteristics known to be related to earnings attainment 
using data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s (CIC) Landing Information Data 
System (LIDS) for 1980 to 1995 merged with the 1996 Census of Canada Public Use 
Microdata File. The major finding from this analysis was that, while the point system 
used to screen both male and female immigrants to Canada for skills and labour market 
suitability does indeed select immigrants who have higher earnings upon arrival than 
those who are not screened, over time the earnings of the two groups converge. These 
models also provided evidence that even entry cohorts containing a large proportion of 
refugees eventually have earnings similar to the independent and family classes, which 
presumably have superior human and social capital at their disposal.  
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Having said this, it was noted that in the case of men, earnings convergence 
between the screened independent class and unscreened classes is observed only in 
models that control for country of birth and its interactions with the human capital 
variables. This implies that country of birth and country differences in returns to human 
capital and entry class composition are associated in such a way that suppresses both 
initial differences and convergence in the case of men. In other words, the shifting 
country-of-origin composition of immigrants to Canada over time and their unmeasured 
traits must be taken into account in a properly specified earnings model. The situation is 
a bit simpler for women in contrasting screened immigrants with those who are not 
screened: those coming in under the point system have earnings advantage over refuges. 
Focusing on male principle applicants in the independent, assisted relative, and 
refugee classes entering Canada from 1981 to 1984, De Silva (1997) found that 
refugees’ earnings converged with those of the independent class at an average of 
approximately 19 years. Using special tabulation from the IMDB, Li (2003) calculated 
the number of years for immigrants in various classes landing in Canada between 1980 
and 1996 to achieve earnings parity with average Canadian male or female employment 
earnings. His estimates for refugees are an average of 11.9 years for men and 12.2 years 
for women. He observed that the convergence time for all entry classes was shorter in 
more recent cohorts than in those arriving in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Given that the evidence indicates rapid convergence in earnings and the relative 
lack of importance of many of the immigrant characteristics reported at landing, it 
follows that the younger the immigrant at the time of landing, the greater his chances of 
doing well in this country. Hence there is a strong indication that age at landing is 
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probably the single most important observable determinant of an immigrant’s ultimate 
success. 
2. B. Studies in Other Countries 
 The international research literature contains a number of studies on immigrants’ 
earnings and adjustment to the labour market. Among such studies the works of 
Chiswick (1978, 1980) had been extremely influential. According to Chiswick, 
immigrant men in the U.S. have been successful in the labour market. He used a sample 
of cross-sectional data from the 1970 U.S. Census and found that immigrant men had 
lower income on their arrival in the U.S. than men in a native comparison group of the 
same social and ethnic origin. After 10-15 years of residence in the U.S. many 
immigrants have obtained the same incomes as the native comparison groups. Their 
incomes become even higher than the corresponding native groups over time. 
Chiswick explained the result within a human capital approach. According to 
Chiswick’s hypothesis the labour-force immigrants are positively selected. They have a 
higher capacity and motivation for work than the native population in the host country. 
The idea of positive selection is based on the assumption that for persons with great 
capacity the benefits from migration are higher than for persons with low capacity 
whereas the costs are about the same. The tendency to migrate will be great if the 
difference between benefits and costs is high. As regards refugees, it can be assumed 
that economic motives do not play the same role as for labour-force migrants. Refugees 
have lower initial earnings than labour-force migrants, but ceteris paribus, they have a 
steeper rise in earnings over time in the host country as their pre-immigration skills 
adjust to the labour market of the host country. 
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A great deal of literature borrows both the theoretical framework and the 
empirical methodology from Chiswick’s work. Carliner (1980), De Freitas (1980) and 
Long (1980) used the same method as Chiswick on alternative data sets and focused on 
specific immigrant groups. These studies came, in all essentials, to the same conclusions 
as Chiswick and tend to confirm the fact that after 10-15 years immigrants do extremely 
well in the U.S. labour market. Chiswick’s (1978) initial estimate of the entry effect for 
men in the U.S. was 16.4% with an initial assimilation rate of 1.5% per year that 
declined with time in the host country, implying that immigrants catch up to their native 
counterparts after 13 years. Subsequent studies have confirmed these basic results for 
many countries, including the United States (e.g., recently Funkhauser and Trejo 1995; 
Yuengert 1994), Canada (Baker and Benjamin 1997; Grant 1999), Australia (McDonald 
and Worswick 1999), and Israel (Friedberg 2000). 
The result obtained by Chiswick was later called into question by Borjas (1985, 
1987, and 1989). Borjas was critical in two different respects. Firstly, Borjas stated that 
cross-section regressions used in the literature mystified the true income assimilation of 
immigrants. Borjas is of the opinion that cross-sectional data give a far too positive 
picture of the immigrants’ income trends. This is due to the fact that the human capital 
of the earlier immigrant cohorts is higher than that of the later immigration cohorts. 
Secondly, Borjas is critical of Chiswick’s hypothesis that labour-market immigrants are 
positively selected. Borjas maintains that negative selection may also occur among 
labour immigrants. Whether positive or negative selection occurs depends on the 
economic and political circumstances in the emigrant and immigrant countries.     
According to Borjas, an important political aspect is whether the immigrants 
come from countries with political repression. Immigrants from such countries have 
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great incentives to adapt to the host country’s labour market, since they have no plans to 
re-emigrate. Borjas tested his hypothesis on data from the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses 
and found a more complicated picture than Chiswick regarding immigrants’ income 
assimilation in the U.S. Borjas found that assimilation took longer than 10-15 years. 
Furthermore, Borjas found declining cohort “quality” over time. However, Borjas’ study 
is not a real longitudinal study. The individuals in the 1970 and 1980 samples are not the 
same. Thus there may be a bias in Borjas’ studies, since the individuals have not been 
followed over time. Besides, Borjas’ samples are restricted to men and also exclude self-
employed men. 
Borjas’ results for recent immigrant cohorts to the U.S. and Canada suggest very 
slow, if not negligible, assimilation. He finds an overall entry effect of 23% for the 
1975–1980 cohort for the U.S. with an assimilation rate of 0.5%, and an entry effect of 
18% for Canada with no significant evidence of assimilation (Borjas 1993b). For the 
1985–1989 U.S. cohorts, Borjas (1996) estimates a comparable entry effect of 19% but 
no assimilation effect. Other studies, however, quite often conclude that immigrants 
assimilate within 20 years for the U.S. (e.g., Funkhauser and Trejo 1995, or Yuengert 
1994) and for Canada (Baker and Benjamin 1997, or Grant 1999). Thus, no clear 
consensus has emerged. 
In an answer to Borjas, Chiswick (1986) repeated his study using data from three 
different cross-sectional observations, the 1970 U.S. census, 1976 Survey of Income and 
Education and the 1980 U.S. Census. From all these sources he found a steeper upward 
earning profile for white immigrant men than for corresponding native groups. After 
about 15 years in the U.S. white immigrant men had higher incomes than corresponding 
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native men. Chiswick argues that this indicates that cross-sectional earnings profiles are 
reasonable proxies for longitudinal changes in income. 
The issue of whether cross-section estimates give biased estimates of 
longitudinal changes in immigrant income adjustment has been tested in more recent 
U.S. studies as well. LaLonde and Topel (1991, 1992) and Duleep and Regets (1996, 
1997) demonstrate that there has been no significant decline in cohort “quality” among 
immigrants in the U.S. when other variables are held constant. Shields and Wheatley 
Price (1998) studied male immigrant earnings in England and found a rather slow 
assimilation rate for immigrant workers. 
Duleep and Regets (1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997) tried to compare the earnings 
profiles of immigrants admitted for humanitarian reasons (mainly family based 
immigrants) with those of immigrants brought in for their skills, relying on census data 
matched with Immigration and Naturalization Service Information on admission criteria 
for country of origin/immigrant cohorts. Their main findings were as follows: First, 
although recent immigrants start with low earnings, this initial disadvantage is more than 
offset by very rapid subsequent growth in earnings. As a result, their earnings tend to 
converge on the native-born level over time. This finding contradicts the earlier results 
reported by Borjas (1988) which showed no convergence. Second, Duleep and Regets 
found that, while the declines in admissions on the basis of occupational skills and the 
corresponding increases in family-based admissions have contributed to a decrease in 
initial earnings, the same factors have also produced a rapid increase in earnings growth. 
This leads the authors to reject the argument that the increased admissions of family-
based immigrants (and the concurrent reduction in the admissions of skilled immigrants) 
are responsible for deterioration in the economic performance of immigrants. Third, the 
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authors also found that the earnings of demographically comparable immigrants, 
regardless of their country of origin, converge with time. The main policy implication of 
the Duleep-Regets analysis is to cast doubt on the usefulness of recent policy initiatives 
undertaken in the United States favouring skilled immigrants. 
Other studies regarding immigrants’ income assimilation are Al-Quadsi and Shah 
(1991), who studied immigrant men in Kuwait, and Poot (1993) who studied immigrant 
men in New Zealand. Both studies used cross-sectional data and the results tended, to 
some extent, to confirm the findings by Chiswick, although the assimilation rate was 
found to be slower. 
European studies of income assimilation have been performed by Dustmann 
(1993), Pischke (1993) and Schmidt (1997), who studied assimilation among immigrant 
men in Germany. The studies showed that the immigrants did not reach the earnings 
level of the native population. 
Wadensjo (1972) and Statistics Sweden (1977) showed that foreign citizens were 
underrepresented among high and low income earners in Sweden. More recent Swedish 
studies of income assimilation have been made by Ekberg (1990, 1994). Ekberg studied 
the immigrants’ longitudinal adaptation to the Swedish labour market with the help of 
data on the total foreign-born population in the Swedish 1970 Census. These immigrants 
were followed in the 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 Censuses. To every foreign born 
individual a Swedish “twin” of the same age, gender, occupation and county of 
residence was selected. Ekberg found small differences between the immigrants who 
had an income from work between 1970 and 1990. If the income from work instead was 
divided among all the individuals in each of the two groups, the immigrants’ relative 
income decreased between 1970 and 1990.  
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Hammarstedt (2003) using the 1985 and 1990 census data showed that in 
Sweden there are statistically significant differences in income from work between 
immigrants and natives even when controlled for variables such as schooling, 
experience, gender, civil status, and place of residence. He also showed that there are 
differences in income from work between immigrants from different regions and 
between immigrant cohorts when controlled for the above mentioned variables. The 
study finds that with exception for immigrants from the Nordic countries, immigrants do 
not reach the same level of income from work as the native population. Income from 
work is higher among immigrants from the Nordic countries than immigrants from other 
regions. Among non-Nordic immigrants, more recent immigrant cohorts have a lower 
income from work than the earlier cohorts. This study suggests that immigrants’ 
incomes increase as time in Sweden increase and most immigrants do not reach the 
income level of natives even by 15 years after immigration.  
There could be a number of explanations for the differences in income from 
work between immigrants and natives. Firstly, it is possible that natives work more 
hours than immigrants. Secondly, it might be that immigrants, holding schooling and 
experience constant, are working in sectors and positions on the labour market that have 
lower wages than those that the native population obtains. This could in turn be due to 
discrimination and/or the fact that immigrants’ human capitals are not fully adjusted to 
the Swedish labour market. 
Indeed, it is often argued that immigrants and natives do not have equal access to 
‘good’ jobs, especially in countries having adopted a ‘guest-worker’ system. This form 
of discrimination against immigrants has been documented in many studies (e.g. Piore, 
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1979; Hammar, 1985).1 Zimmermann (1994) documents this fact for the ‘guest-worker’ 
countries Germany and Switzerland where immigrants are heavily represented in 
construction and manufacturing. By contrast, the sectoral distribution of natives and 
immigrants are very similar in the United States. 
There is discrimination against immigrants in the sense that only natives have 
long-term, implicit labour contracts, whereas immigrants are hired freely at the current 
wage rate. Schmidt et al. (1994) analyze the impact of immigration in the presence of 
trade unions in the market for unskilled labour. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1996) 
use an insider–outsider model of wage bargaining to evaluate the impact of immigration 
on wages of young natives. They assume the existence of a two-tier wage system, where 
immigrants (outsiders) receive lower wages than native workers (insiders).  
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Many Canadian studies found that since early eighties newer immigrants were 
economically faring not as well across successive immigrant cohorts, while their 
assimilation rates are uniformly small. The entry earnings were tipped to be smaller for 
recent immigrants than their predecessors and estimates of this fall vary from 10% to 
20% from study to study. Some of the remarkable findings of the existing literature on 
immigrants’ earnings are that the points system contributed to a shift in the occupational 
composition from less skilled categories such as labourers toward professionals; Greater 
proficiency in the official languages enhances the effects on earnings of schooling and 
pre-immigration labour market experience; Immigrants themselves never catch up to 
otherwise comparable native born workers, but that their children do just as well. 
                                                 
1 One consequence of this form of discrimination is the different sectoral distribution of natives and 
immigrants. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Data and Descriptive Evidence 
With arrival of new immigrants the situation in the labour market changes and 
this chapter recounts those theories. In this section we also elaborately discuss the nature 
of our data. But first, we focus on the effects of immigration on the labour market, 
particularly on income, using the basic labour supply and labour demand. 
3.A. Labour Market Effect of Immigration: Theory 
 In a competitive labour market supply and demand for labour determine the 
equilibrium wage and employment level. In Figure 1, LS0 is the original labour supply  
Figure 1: Labour Supply Effect
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curves intersect at point A and the equilibrium wage level is W0 and equilibrium 
employment level is E0.
The supply side effects suggest that if immigrants and Canadians are substitutes 
of each other in the labour market, influx of new immigrants AB will shift the supply of 
labour to the right to LS1. Point C will be the intersection of the original demand curve 
LD0 and the new supply curve LS1. It is evident that although the employment level rises 
from E0 to E1, the equilibrium wage decreases to W1. 
If immigrants and Canadians are complements in the labour market, the inflow of 
immigrants comes into a different labour market and increases the demand for 
complementary Canadian workers, as can be seen in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Labour Demand Effect 
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There will be, therefore, an increase in demand for labour and LD1 will become 
the new labour demand curve. The intersection point of the labour supply and labour 
demand curve will move from A to C. Consequently, wage level increases to W1 from 
W0 and employment level also increases to E1. 
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The demand side effects suggest that with more immigrants coming in, their will 
be an increased demand for goods and services, which in turn, will increase the product 
prices and consequently labour demand and wages as is evident from Figure 2. The 
demand side effects are similar to that of supply side when immigrants are complements 
to Canadians and opposite to the supply side effects when immigrants are substitutes to 
Canadians. In the substitute case the overall effect, therefore, depends on which of the 
effect is more dominant over the other. 
The empirical analysis of this study uses Canadian data drawn from the 1996 
census microdata files. A person is defined to be an immigrant if he or she was born 
abroad and then immigrated to Canada, including naturalised citizens; all other persons 
are classified as Canadians (visitors are not considered).  
Workers are sorted into particular skill groups using their education level: 
persons who are high school dropouts are in group 1 (i.e., they have less than twelve 
years of schooling), high school graduates are in group 2 (they have exactly twelve years 
of schooling), persons who have some college are in group 3 (they have between thirteen 
and fifteen years of schooling), and college graduates are in group 4 (they have at least 
sixteen years of schooling). 
Statistics Canada refers to people younger than twenty five years as ‘youth’. By 
and large people’s careers start shaping up from the age of twenty five (most people start 
settling down on their jobs at that age) and mid-sixties is the customary retirement age. 
Accordingly, this analysis is restricted to men and women aged 25-64 who participate in 
the civilian labour force. One of the objectives of this study is to compare earnings of 
comparable Canadian and immigrant labours. To warrant homogeneity among labours 
we only consider full-time (thirty or more hours of work per week), full-year (fifty or 
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more weeks of work per year) workers. Since we only consider wage earners, income of 
an individual is determined by his/her wage earnings (minimum yearly income of $7,500 
with 1500 hours of work per year at a minimum wage of $5).  
In the 1996 census data occupations have been divided into 25 categories and 
industries have been divided into 16 categories. We examine the effect of change in 
proportion of immigrants on the wage level based on occupations and also on industries. 
To control for job environment and individual characteristics, we use dummy variables 
for provinces, metropolitan areas, visible minority status, having of dependent children, 
language efficiency, and marital status. 
3. B. Average Effect on Income Based on Occupation 
In Table 1 we provide an overview of the immigration composition of 
occupational categories and its consequences for wages in Canada for both sexes jointly. 
The statistics are reported for all occupations as well as separately for ‘immigrant’, 
‘mixed’, and ‘Canadian’ occupations. We measure the ‘immigrantness’ of occupations 
as the proportion of employment that is immigrant (hereafter referred to as PIMM).  
The calculation of average PIMM can be described using the following example.  
 Occupation 1 Occupation 2 Total 
N of Canadians 80 20 100 
N of Immigrants 20 80 100 
Total 100 100  
PIMM .2 or 20% .8 or 80%  
AVG. PIMM Canadians (80*.2+20*.8)/100   
 32/100=.32 or 32%   
AVG. PIMM Immigrants (20*.2+80*.8)/100   
 68/100=.68 or 68%   
 
There are two occupations in the economy. Out of 100 workers in occupation 1 there are 
80 Canadians and 20 immigrants implying the PIMM for occupation 1 to be 20% 0.2. 20 
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Canadians and 80 immigrants out of 100 workers in occupation 2 imply a PIMM of 80% 
or 0.8 for occupation 2. Therefore, the average PIMM of Canadians for all jobs is 
32.0
100
)8.020()2.080( =×+×  or 32%. Similarly, the average PIMM of immigrants for 
all jobs is 68.0
100
)8.080()2.020( =×+×  or 68%. When we calculate the average PIMM 
for ‘immigrant’ occupations, we only consider the occupations with PIMM of 24.67% or 
higher. Calculation of average PIMM for ‘mixed’ and ‘Canadian’ occupations follows 
similar process with their respective range of PIMM. 
We also report the estimated coefficient  using OLS from the regression, 
∧φ
iii PIMMWLN εφδ ++= ).()( .  
Using the average income and the estimated coefficients we can measure the 
effect on average annual income with any changes in PIMM in occupations. We report 
 to calculate the percentage change in the coefficients. Multiplying this 
percentage change with the average income of a group gives us the estimated effect on 
annual income of that group when PIMM changes.  
1exp −φ
Immigrants made up approximately 20 – 19.647 to be exact – percent of the 
workforce in Canada in 1996 when we restrict our data to only full-time, full-year 
workers. Standard deviation of occupational PIMM is 5.03; thus, occupations 
comprising between (19.64+5.03=) 24.67 and (19.64-5.03=) 14.61 percent of 
immigrants are categorised as ‘mixed’. These occupations represented 72 percent of 
immigrant employment and 77 percent of Canadian employment. ‘Immigrant’ 
occupations are defined as those with an immigrantness rate of 24.67 percent or higher. 
These occupations represented 24 percent of immigrant employment as opposed to 14 
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percent of Canadian employment. ‘Canadian’ occupations are defined as those with an 
immigrantness rate of less than 14.61 percent. These occupations represented 4 percent 
of immigrant employment and 9 percent of Canadian employment. Across all 
occupations, the immigrantness rate, PIMM, is about 21 percent for immigrants while 
for Canadians it is 19 percent. We also report average wages for all occupations and for 
occupations by type, which allows us to compare the average immigrant wages to that of 
Canadians. Note that the averages do not account for differences in personal 
characteristics (e.g. age, education) and differences among groups may be instigated by 
these pertinent factors. This will be explored more in detail later. 
Table 1: Effect on Annual Income by Occupation Type (Both Sexes)
OCCUPATIONS TOTAL N
% of 
TOTAL PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME
CANADIANS 126,284 100.00 19.33 $ 39,865 -0.006 -0.006 -$ 252 ALL JOBS 
IMMIGRANTS 30,878 100.00 20.94 $ 39,108 -0.018 -0.018 -$ 696 
CANADIANS 18,165 14.38 28.69 $ 31,150 0.034 0.035 $ 1,083 IMMIGRANT 
JOBS2 IMMIGRANTS 7,326 23.73 28.85 $ 28,063 0.019 0.019 $ 524 
CANADIANS 97,059 76.86 18.53 $ 41,697 0.041 0.042 $ 1,760 MIXED 
JOBS IMMIGRANTS 22,183 71.84 18.92 $ 42,923 0.039 0.039 $ 1,686 
CANADIANS 11,060 8.76 10.98 $ 38,100 -0.049 -0.047 -$ 1,806 CANADIAN 
JOBS IMMIGRANTS 1369 4.43 11.31 $ 36,398 -0.013 -0.013 -$ 476 
 
For all occupations average income of immigrants is $39,108 compared to 
$39,865 of Canadians, difference of round about $757. This comparison makes a far 
more interesting reading when we inspect it by occupation types. In ‘immigrant’ 
occupations, where there is the highest concentration of immigrants among all types of 
occupations, average immigrant income is $28,063 compared to $31,150 of Canadians, a 
                                                 
2 List of occupations under each category can be found in appendix 1. 
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difference of more than $3,000. Contrastingly in ‘Canadian’ occupations, where there is 
the lowest concentration of immigrants among all types, difference in average income 
between the groups is $1,700 in favour of Canadians, although income of both groups is 
significantly higher (about $8,000 more) than in ‘immigrant’ occupations. Surprisingly, 
immigrants make $1,226 more than Canadians in ‘mixed’ occupations. 
For all types of occupations altogether for men and women combined, an 
increase in PIMM leads to a decline in average annual income for both Canadians and 
immigrants, although not by very much, $250 and $700 respectively. For ‘immigrant’ 
occupations this effect is positive and large. For Canadians in ‘immigrant’ occupations 
the increase in average annual income is $1,083. But, immigrants in the same 
occupational category gain significantly less, mere $524. For ‘mixed’ occupations the 
effect on average annual income is positive with an increase in PIMM. Rise in income in 
‘mixed’ occupations is substantial, $1,760 for Canadians and $1,686 for immigrants. In 
‘Canadian’ occupations increase in PIMM makes Canadians pay penalty in the amount 
of a galloping $1,800, far more than it does immigrants ($476). 
Table 2: Effect on Annual Income by Occupation Type (Male)
MALE  N
% of 
TOTAL PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME
CANADIANS 75,247 100.00 19.54 $44,947 -0.002 -0.002 -$ 80 ALL JOBS 
IMMIGRANTS 18,648 100.00 21.18 $44,104 -0.014 -0.014 -$ 599 
CANADIANS 11,502 15.29 28.78 $36,295 0.060 0.062 $ 2,254 IMMIGRANT 
JOBS IMMIGRANTS 4,252 22.80 29.04 $32,386 0.015 0.015 $ 501 
CANADIANS 53,618 71.26 19.16 $47,933 0.018 0.019 $ 894 MIXED JOBS 
IMMIGRANTS 13,161 70.58 19.56 $48,511 0.021 0.021 $ 1,029 
CANADIANS 10,127 13.46 11.04 $38,967 -0.050 -0.049 -$ 1,894 CANADIAN 
JOBS IMMIGRANTS 1235 6.62 11.37 $37,492 -0.017 -0.017 -$ 622 
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Table 2 above and Table 3 below show the same comparisons as in Table 1, but 
separately for males and females respectively. Although the actual numbers are of 
course different for males from both sexes together, it follows a very similar pattern. In 
‘immigrant’ occupations Canadian males gain a significantly higher benefit than 
immigrant men and in ‘Canadian’ occupations Canadian men pay a significantly higher 
penalty than immigrant males with an increase in PIMM. There appears a twist in the 
tale when we examine women.   
Table 3: Effect on Annual Income by Occupation Type (Female)
FEMALE  N 
% of 
TOTAL PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1 
EFFECT on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME 
CANADIANS 51,037 100.00 19.03 $32,372 -0.022 -0.022 -$ 716 ALL JOBS 
IMMIGRANTS 12,230 100.00 20.58 $31,490 -0.030 -0.029 -$ 918 
CANADIANS 6,663 13.06 28.54 $22,270 -0.018 -0.018 -$ 403 IMMIGRANT 
JOBS IMMIGRANTS 3,074 25.13 28.59 $22,083 -0.008 -0.008 -$ 170 
CANADIANS 43,441 85.12 17.76 $34,001 0.038 0.039 $ 1,319 MIXED JOBS 
IMMIGRANTS 9,022 73.77 18.00 $34,772 0.032 0.033 $ 1,145 
CANADIANS 933 1.83 10.31 $28,692 -0.119 -0.112 -$ 3,217 CANADIAN 
JOBS IMMIGRANTS 134 1.10 10.72 $26,318 -0.062 -0.060 -$ 1,585 
 
Canadian females pay a substantial penalty in ‘immigrant’ as well as in ‘Canadian’ 
occupations with an increase in PIMM; the knock on their annual income is well over 
twice as much the hit that immigrant females take, although in ‘mixed’ occupations, 
both groups reap high benefits with increase in PIMM. 
 The results vary significantly if we categorise immigrants according to their 
place of birth, year of immigration, or the age at which they immigrated. The following 
Tables show us the effect on annual income of male immigrants and compare that to the 
effect on income of men from the rest of the labour force. 
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 Not categorising occupations allows us to see the overall picture and make 
relevant comparisons. Average income of non-European, non-US immigrant males is 
$38,796 compared to $45,861 of rest of the male in the labour force, difference of more 
than $7000. 
Table 4: Effect on Annual Income by Birthplace and Year of Immigration (Male)
MALE 
(OCCUPATION) N PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME
NONWHITE 
IMMIGRANTS 14,370 16.03 $38,796 -0.025 -0.025 -$ 974 
OTHERS 79,525 15.20 $45,861 -0.015 -0.015 -$ 684 
MIGRATED 
AFTER 1980 5,954 7.76 $35,989 -0.032 -0.032 -$ 1,144 
OTHERS 87,941 6.27 $45,375 -0.021 -0.021 -$ 945 
MIGRATED 
AFTER 1990 1,943 2.59 $31,514 -0.087 -0.083 -$ 2,615 
OTHERS 91,952 2.01 $45,060 -0.077 -0.074 -$ 3,324 
 
Difference in income of immigrant men who came to Canada after 1980 and 
other men is close to $10,000. The same difference for men of post 1990 cohorts and 
other men is an astounding over $13,500. 
Table 5: Effect on Annual Income by Age of Immigration (Male)
MALE 
(OCCUPATION) N PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 12 13,994 16.65 $43,055 -0.019 -0.019 -$ 802 
OTHERS 79,901 14.71 $45,082 -0.007 -0.007 -$ 308 
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 19 11,260 13.45 $43,019 -0.023 -0.023 -$ 981 
OTHERS 82,635 11.79 $45,020 -0.007 -0.007 -$ 334 
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 24 7,760 9.19 $42,428 -0.032 -0.031 -$ 1,334 
OTHERS 86135 8.00 $44,992 -0.011 -0.011 -$ 477 
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 29 4474 5.36 $41,387 -0.058 -0.056 -$ 2,338 
OTHERS 89421 4.61 $44,950 -0.025 -0.025 -$ 1,102 
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 39 969 1.24 $37,639 -0.248 -0.220 -$ 8,269 
OTHERS 92926 0.99 $44,855 -0.154 -0.142 -$ 6,387 
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The older the entry ages of immigrant men the higher the penalty of an increase 
in PIMM for them and for other men. This penalty ranges from $800 for migrating after 
age 12 to $8,200 for migrating after age 39 for immigrant men. The same range for other 
men is from $300 to $6,300. 
3. C. Average Effect on Income Based on Industry 
This section, in effect, is an extension of the previous chapter with the exception 
that instead of dividing the labour force according to their occupations, we do it 
according to the industries they work in. The statistics are reported for all industries as 
well as separately for ‘immigrant’, ‘mixed’, and ‘Canadian’ industries. Standard 
deviation of industrial PIMM is 5.05; thus, industries comprising between (19.64+5.05=) 
24.69 and (19.64-5.05=) 14.59 percent of immigrants are categorised as ‘mixed’. These 
industries represented approximately 60 percent of both immigrant and Canadian 
employments. ‘Immigrant’ industries are defined as those with an immigrantness rate of 
24.69 percent or higher; ‘Canadian’ industries are defined as those with an 
immigrantness rate of less than 14.59 percent. They represented 10 percent of immigrant 
jobs and 20 percent of Canadian jobs. 
Across all industries, the immigrantness rate, PIMM, is about 21 percent for 
immigrants while for Canadians it is 19 percent. In ‘immigrant’ industries average 
immigrant income is $36,457 compared to $40,055 of Canadians, a difference of more 
than $3,500. Contrastingly in ‘Canadian’ industries difference in average income 
between the groups is $1,600 in favour of the immigrants, although income of both 
groups is significantly higher than in immigrant industries. Immigrants make more than 
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Canadians in mixed industries as well, which account for most immigrants and 
Canadians, approximately 60 percent of both. 
Table 6: Effect on Annual Income by Industry Type (Both Sexes)
INDUSTRIES TOTAL N
% of 
TOTAL PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT 
on 
ANNUAL
INCOME
CANADIANS 126,284 100.00 19.33 $ 39,865 -0.014 -0.013 -$ 535 ALL 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 30,878 100.00 20.95 $ 39,108 -0.021 -0.021 -$ 824 
CANADIANS 24,821 19.65 26.66 $ 40,055 -0.104 -0.099 -$ 3,953 IMMIGRANT 
INDUSTRIES3 IMMIGRANTS 9,059 29.34 26.94 $ 36,457 -0.073 -0.070 -$ 2,563 
CANADIANS 76,989 60.96 19.26 $ 38,545 -0.016 -0.016 -$ 599 MIXED 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 18,438 59.71 19.59 $ 39,254 -0.023 -0.022 -$ 877 
CANADIANS 24,474 19.38 12.11 $ 43,826 -0.016 -0.016 -$ 699 CANADIAN 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 3381 10.95 12.33 $ 45,416 -0.021 -0.021 -$ 937 
 
  We also report the estimated coefficient  using OLS from the regression, 
∧φ
iii PIMMWLN εφδ ++= ).()( .  
Using the average income and the estimated coefficients we can measure the effect on 
average annual income with any changes in PIMM in industries. For all industries 
altogether for men and women combined, an increase in PIMM leads to a decline in 
average annual income for both Canadians and immigrants, although, not by very much, 
$535 and $824 respectively. For ‘immigrant’ industries this effect is very large. 
Canadians in ‘immigrant’ jobs pay a penalty in the amount of $4000. Immigrants in the 
same category are penalised in the amount of $2500. For ‘mixed’ industries the effect on 
average annual income is also negative with an increase in PIMM. Fall in income in 
‘mixed’ industries is not as substantial, $600 for Canadians and $877 for immigrants. In 
                                                 
3 List of industries under each category can be found in appendix 1 
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‘Canadian’ industries increase in PIMM makes Canadians pay penalty in the amount of 
$700, less than it does immigrants ($937). 
 Table 7 and Table 8 below show the same comparisons separately for males and 
females respectively. Although the actual numbers are of course different for males from 
both sexes together, it follows a very similar pattern. In ‘immigrant’ industries Canadian 
males pay a significantly higher penalty than immigrant men and in ‘Canadian’ 
industries immigrant men pay higher penalty than Canadian males with increase in 
PIMM. There appears a small twist in the tale when we examine women separately. 
Table 7: Effect on Annual Income by Industry Type (Male)
INDUSTRIES MALE N
% 
of 
TOTAL PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME
CANADIANS 75,247 100.00 19.29 $ 44,947 -0.008 -0.008 -$ 345 ALL 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 18,648 100.00 21.11 $ 44,104 -0.018 -0.018 -$ 806 
CANADIANS 17,978 23.89 26.28 $ 44,669 -0.088 -0.084 -$ 3,759 IMMIGRANT 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 6,305 33.81 26.76 $ 41,194 -0.080 -0.077 -$ 3,158 
CANADIANS 40,803 54.23 19.14 $ 43,998 -0.001 -0.001 -$ 62 MIXED 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 10,139 54.37 19.51 $ 44,600 -0.009 -0.009 -$ 399 
CANADIANS 16,466 21.88 12.04 $ 47,603 -0.017 -0.017 -$ 800 CANADIAN 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 2204 11.82 12.30 $ 50,150 -0.024 -0.024 -$ 1,192 
 
Canadian females pay substantial penalty in immigrant industries with an 
increase in PIMM; the knock on their annual income is well over twice as much the hit 
that immigrant females take. But, in Canadian industries immigrant females suffer ever 
so slightly, where as Canadian females actually reap some benefit with increase in 
PIMM. 
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Table 8: Effect on Annual Income by Industry Type (Female)
INDUSTRIES FEMALE N
% of 
TOTAL PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT 
on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME
CANADIANS 51,037 100.00 19.38 $ 32,372 -0.024 -0.023 -$ 756 ALL 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 12,230 100.00 20.71 $ 31,490 -0.030 -0.029 -$ 926 
CANADIANS 6,843 13.41 27.67 $ 27,932 -0.081 -0.078 -$ 2,165 IMMIGRANT 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 2,754 22.52 27.37 $ 25,614 -0.040 -0.039 -$ 1,005 
CANADIANS 36,186 70.90 19.39 $ 32,396 -0.028 -0.028 -$ 900 MIXED 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 8,299 67.86 19.68 $ 32,722 -0.037 -0.037 -$ 1,198 
CANADIANS 8008 15.69 12.26 $ 36,059 0.008 0.008 $ 297 CANADIAN 
INDUSTRIES IMMIGRANTS 1177 9.62 12.39 $ 36,552 -0.003 -0.003 -$ 92 
 
The results vary significantly if we categorise immigrants according to their 
place of birth, year of immigration, or the age at which they immigrated to Canada. The 
following Tables show us the effect on annual incomes of male immigrants and compare 
that to the effect on income of men of the rest of the labour force. 
Table 9: Effect on Annual Income by Birthplace and Year of Immigration (Male)
MALE 
(INDUSTRY) N PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME
NONWHITE 
IMMIGRANTS 14,370 15.90 $ 38,796 -0.032 -0.031 -$ 1,213 
OTHERS 79,525 15.20 $ 45,861 -0.018 -0.018 -$ 808 
MIGRATED 
AFTER 1980 5,954 7.84 $ 35,989 -0.035 -0.034 -$ 1,234 
OTHERS 87,941 6.25 $ 45,375 -0.022 -0.022 -$ 976 
MIGRATED 
AFTER 1990 1,943 2.67 $ 31,514 -0.090 -0.086 -$ 2,698 
OTHERS 91,952 2.02 $ 45,060 -0.074 -0.071 -$ 3,214 
 
Increase in PIMM penalises non-European, non-US immigrant males by $1,200 
and other males by $800. Immigrant men who came to Canada after 1980 are penalised 
by $1,200 with an increase in PIMM and other men pay a penalty of approximately 
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$1,000. Immigrant men of post-1990 cohorts face a penalty of $2,700 with an increase in 
PIMM and other men face a penalty of $3,200. 
Average income of immigrant males who migrated after age 12 is $43,000 
compared to $37,000 of immigrant men who migrated after age 39. The older the entry 
ages of immigrant men the higher the penalty of an increase in PIMM for them and for 
other men. This penalty ranges from $900 for migrating after age 12 to $9,300 for 
migrating after age 39 for immigrant men. The same range for other men is from $400 to 
$8,100. 
Table 10: Effect on Annual Income by Age of Immigration (Male)
MALE 
(INDUSTRY) N PIMM
AVG. 
INCOME COEF. e(COF)-1
EFFECT on 
ANNUAL 
INCOME
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 12 13,994 16.48 $ 43,055 -0.021 -0.021 -$ 907 
OTHERS 79,901 14.47 $ 45082 -0.010 -0.010 -$ 431 
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 19 11,260 13.30 $ 43,019 -0.025 -0.025 -$ 1,068 
OTHERS 82,635 11.60 $ 45,020 -0.011 -0.011 -$ 487 
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 24 7,760 9.10 $ 42,428 -0.034 -0.034 -$ 1,437 
OTHERS 86135 7.84 $ 44,992 -0.015 -0.015 -$ 654 
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 29 4474 5.29 $ 41,387 -0.054 -0.053 -$ 2,188 
OTHERS 89421 4.54 $ 44,950 -0.030 -0.029 -$ 1,315 
MIGRATED 
AFTER AGE 39 969 1.24 $ 37,639 -0.286 -0.249 -$ 9,370 
OTHERS 92926 0.99 $ 44,855 -0.200 -0.181 -$ 8,131 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 We see that increase in percentage of immigrants in jobs have non-negligible 
effects on the annual income at the micro level. This is truer for the leaner definitions of 
immigrants. We are going to find out more about these effects in the subsequent 
sections.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Econometric Framework 
This study draws inspiration from well-publicized work of Baker and Fortin 
(2001), who studied the relationship between ‘femaleness’ and wage differentials of 
occupations for men and women in Canada. They used proportion of females in 
occupations (PFEM) and studied the effects of change in PFEM on wages for both males 
and females. This thesis employs similar technique, only use proportion of immigrants 
(PIMM) in occupations to study the effects of change in PIMM on wages for both male 
and female immigrants and Canadians. It also uses the PIMM in industries to study 
comparable effects. 
Our main objective is to investigate the effect of an increase in occupational as 
well as in industrial PIMM on income of immigrants and Canadians. This will also allow 
us to conjecture whether there is any discrimination against immigrants or if they are 
segregated into low paying occupations or industries. We start our proceedings with 
dividing individuals into 25 occupational categories. 
4. A. Occupational Categories 
A standard wage equation captures the effects of wage determining factors on 
income. Income of individual i  is therefore: 
iii VXWLN += β)( ,          
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where  is the log of yearly income,  are characteristics that vary by 
individuals, and  is an individual specific error term. 
)( iWLN iX
iV
This study is investigating if the occupation that a person works in has any 
influence in determining his or her income and whether percentage of immigrants 
working in an occupation has any relevance in determining the wages of that occupation. 
We, therefore, include a dummy variable for occupations in our wage equation and 
specify the income of individual  as i
ikkii VOCCXWLN ++= )()( αβ ,       (1) 
where  are occupational category dummy variables that take the value 1 if the 
individual is in occupation  ( k =1 to 25) and 0 otherwise. The occupational category 
wage effects, 
kOCC
k
kα , captures the impact of various characteristics of occupation  on 
individual wages, controlling for the individual characteristics . The interest here is 
one characteristic in particular: the percentage of employment in occupation  that is 
immigrants, denoted . Therefore, we focus on the equation 
k
iX
k
kPIMM
kkk PIMM ηφλα ++= )( ,        (2) 
where φ  is the parameter of interest and where kη  captures the wage effects of 
occupation  characteristics other than . In other words, (un)desirability of 
occupation specific characteristics such as job security, working environment etc. has an 
effect in determining the wage level and  
k kPIMM
kη  captures that.   
A common assumption in similar previous studies is that the residual occupation 
effects, kη , such as the effects of workplace safety and flexible hours are unrelated to 
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kPIMM . In this case estimating equation (2) yields unbiased estimates of φ , or in other 
words, φ  will not be influenced by the omitted characteristics of occupations.  
As mentioned above, the question this study is attempting answered can be 
divided into two separate and equally important parts: (1) if the occupation that a person 
works in has any influence in determining his or her income, and (2) whether percentage 
of immigrants working in an occupation (PIMM) has any relevance in determining the 
wages of that occupation. To that end, estimating equation (1) 
[ ikkii VOCCXWLN ++= )()( αβ ] gives us the answer to the first part of the puzzle and 
estimating equation (2) [ kkk PIMM ηφλα ++= )( ] answers the second part of the 
question as well as the overall question, which is whether φ  affects income. 
To implement this ‘two-step’ approach, we first estimate equation (1) by 
ordinary least-squares (OLS). The resulting estimates of the occupation wage effects can 
be expressed as   
kkk εαα +=
∧
,          (3) 
where kε  is the measurement error in the . Step 2 estimates the equation k
∧α
)()( kkkk PIMM ηεφλα +++=
∧
,       (4) 
using the estimates of the occupation effects in equation (2) as the dependent variable. 
There are two components in the error term, kε  or kη , and the appropriate estimation 
strategy for equation (4) depends on which of the error components dominates the in the 
composition of the error term. Number of people working in each occupation is not the 
same suggesting a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) strategy. The appropriate weights are 
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proportional to an occupation’s sample size or the variance of its fixed effect kα . In the 
composite error term if kη  - wage effects of occupation  characteristics other than 
 - is dominant, OLS is appropriate for the second stage and each occupation 
would be weighted equally. It is our choice for this study to use OLS for the first step 
(equation 1) and WLS for the second step (equation 2) using each occupation’s 
proportion in the labour force as its weight. 
k
kPIMM
We also estimate the more common approach used in the literature, a ‘one-step’ 
method to obtain an estimate of φ  from the equation 
)()()( ikkii VPIMMXWLN ++++= ηφβλ ,     (5) 
Equation (5) yields unbiased estimates of φ  if kη  is orthogonal to   and . 
That the immigrantness of occupations (PIMM) is uncorrelated with occupational 
characteristics, , allows us to not include the occupational dummy variables in the 
one-step model. To elaborate, we are assuming that higher income in one occupation due 
to inflexibility of working hours or unsafe work environment has little to do with the 
proportion of immigrants working in that particular occupation. One implication of this 
assumption is that the variable PIMM will not capture the wage effect of (un)desirability 
of the nature of the occupation such as job safety or flexibility of working hours.    
kPIMM iX
kOCC
That the standard errors estimated by the one-step model are potentially biased 
makes the ‘two-step’ procedure of equation (1) and (2) more preferable. Workers 
working in the same occupation face similar appealing or repelling characteristics of that 
particular occupation. Hence, because of kη , the composite error term is correlated 
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across individuals within occupations. Moulton (1986) has extensively discussed this 
problem of using grouped data in an individual-level regression. 
 Relaxing the assumption that residual occupation effects are uncorrelated with 
the individual characteristics and occupational immigrantness rate, any wage-related 
occupational characteristics do not bias the estimate of β  in the two-step procedure. 
This is because unrestricted occupation fixed effects are included in the first stage. 
Although, the coefficient of interest that we estimate from the second stage, φ , is subject 
to a standard omitted variables bias. Variables for job security, risk associated with the 
occupation, flexibility of working hours, among others, are possible notable exclusions.  
The estimates of both β  and φ  are biased in the one-step procedure. Occupation 
effects that are not linear in  and correlated with  cause kPIMM iX β  to be biased.  
 Some previous studies on gender-based segregation report that one-step and two-
step estimation strategies can lead to different results.4 Considering the instances in 
which they estimate the same object is, therefore, useful. If kη  is truly a random effect, 
the two procedures should lead to similar estimates, all else being equal. If the 
uncorrelated (orthogonality) condition does not hold, each procedure produces a biased 
estimate of φ . However, under the following circumstances the bias should be the same: 
(1) If there are no other control variables in the regression (i.e., no ), or (2) if iX β  in 
both the procedures are same. As noted above, the estimate of β  from the two-step 
procedure is unbiased, while the estimate of β  from the one-step procedure is not. For 
the bias in the estimated φ  to be different in the two procedures, however, this 
                                                 
4 For Example, Macpherson and Hirsch (1995, page 450) report that the gender composition coefficient 
for males (using their expanded specification) is -0.0986 from a one-step procedure, and -0.1305 from a 
two-step procedure. 
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difference is not sufficient. The individual characteristics, , also has to be correlated 
with the immigrantness rate, , for the bias in the estimated 
iX
kPIMM φ  to be different in 
the two procedures. If, on the other hand, they are uncorrelated, the two procedures 
should have a similar bias. 
 To have a more clear perspective on this bias issue, it is helpful to think about the 
possible components of the residual occupation effects, kη . Omitted job characteristics 
may be the solitary basis of compensating wage differentials across occupations. The 
evidence in Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) suggests that when these characteristics are 
omitted there is a significant bias in estimates of the effect of gender composition on 
wages. Another component of the residual occupation effects can be the average 
characteristics of co-workers in an occupation, which can be motivated by human capital 
externalities (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Angrist 2000; Moretti 1999).5 This example is 
interesting because it is type of omitted variable that would lead the one-step and two-
step estimates of φ  to differ. Observable components of these human capital 
externalities are simply the average  by occupation, denoted iX kX . 
 Let us assume that the bias in φ  is due to the correlation of  with the 
omitted variable 
kPIMM
kX . kX  is correlated with  by construction, which implies that 
 is also correlated with . In this case the bias in the estimate of 
iX
kPIMM iX β  
compounds the standard omitted variable bias in the one-step estimate of φ . In the two-
                                                 
5 Individuals’ wages increasing in the average education in their occupation is an example of such an 
externality effect.  
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step procedure there is only the standard omitted variables bias in  and the estimate of 
∧φ
β  is unbiased. 
 
4. B. Industrial Categories 
Now we repeat the above mentioned process dividing individuals into 16 
industrial categories. Thus, the revised equations (1 to 5) become:     
ikkii VINDXWLN ++= )()( αβ ,       (1a) 
where the  are characteristics that vary by individuals,  are industrial category 
dummy variables that take the value 1 if the individual is in industry  ( k =1 to 16) and 
0 otherwise,  is an individual specific error term. The industrial category wage effects, 
iX kIND
k
iV
kα , captures the impact of the various characteristics of industry k  on individual wages, 
controlling for the individual characteristics . The interest here is one characteristic in 
particular: the percentage of employment in industry  that is immigrants, 
denoted . Therefore, we focus on the equation 
iX
k
kPIMM
kkk PIMM ηφλα ++= )( ,        (2a) 
where φ  is the parameter of interest and kη  captures the wage effects of industry k  
characteristics other than .   kPIMM
kkk εαα +=
∧
,          (3a) 
where kε  is the measurement error in the . Next, we estimate the equation k
∧α
)()( kkkk PIMM ηεφλα +++=
∧
,       (4a) 
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using the estimates of the industry effects in equation (2a) as the dependent variable. For 
the second step (equation 2a) we use proportion of each industry’s sample size as 
weight.  
It is more common in the literature to obtain an estimate of φ  using a ‘one-step’ 
method. The two-step method can be sidestepped by estimating 
)()()( ikkii VPIMMXWLN ++++= ηφβλ ,     (5a) 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 Our main objective is to investigate the effect of an increase in occupational as 
well as in industrial PIMM on income of immigrants and Canadians. Now that we 
outlined the methodology used in this study, in the following section we will discuss the 
estimates of the coefficients that interest us.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Results 
In this section we present comprehensive estimates of our one-step and two-step 
procedures of the relationship between wages and the immigrantness of occupations and 
industries in Canada (PIMM). It is our belief that there is little reason for the 
β coefficients to be identical for men and women. Or in other words, individual and job 
characteristics affect men and women differently. As a result, presenting the estimates 
separately for men and women enables us to compare the effect on Canadian men 
against that on immigrant men and Canadian women against their immigrant 
counterparts. When we categorise immigrants according to various criterion (e.g. age of 
immigration), we compare those immigrants against the rest of the labour force. 
5. A. Occupational Categories 
5. A. 1 (a). Earning Function: Two Step Procedure 
Table 11 presents the estimates of the first-step (equation 1) of the two-step 
approach for males and females – Canadians and immigrants separately – when we 
classify the labour force into 25 occupational categories. We use dummy variables for 
education attainment. College graduates are our base group (almost one third of the 
individuals in our sample are college graduates) and the other three groups are high 
school dropouts, high school graduates, and people with more than high school but less 
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than 16 years of schooling. Dummy variables are also used for (1) marital status, with 
people reporting living with a spouse at the time of questioning regarded as married and 
all others as singles, (2) having dependent children, (3) visible minority status, (4) 
efficiency in official language(s), (5) living in metropolitan areas (CMAs), and (6) 
province of residence, where we use Ontario as the base province (a little less than half 
of the sample population live there). It is important mentioning that we do not consider 
people living in Yukon and the North-West Territories in our dataset. 
Table 11: Estimated Effects of Wage Determining Factors from Two-Step Procedure (Occupation)
1ST STEP OLS MALE FEMALE 
OCCUPATION CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS 
Age 0.066 0.048 0.065 0.047 
Age Square -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
EDUCATION BASE GROUP: COLLEGE GRADUATES 
Some Schooling -23.02 -21.79 -25.75 -21.19 
High School Graduates -17.56 -19.40 -19.88 -16.88 
Some College -13.44 -12.63 -15.80 -12.22 
MARITAL STATUS BASE GROUP: LEGALLY NOT MARRIED 
Legally Married 9.61 5.70 -0.17 6 -2.17 
CHILDREN BASE GROUP: NO DEPENDENT CHILD 
Have Dependent Child(ren) 6.60 4.57 -4.62 -2.04 
CITYDWELLERS BASE GROUP: NOT METROPOLITAN CITY RESIDENTS 
City Residents 7.98 1.92 11.79 10.68 
MINORITY STATUS BASE GROUP: NOT VISIBLE MINORITIES 
Visible Minorities -5.31 -17.22 -0.94 -7.79 
FIRST LANGUAGE BASE GROUP: NOT ENGLISH and/or FRENCH 
English and/or French 5.34 11.55 0.65 8.08 
PROVINCE BASE GROUP: ONTARIO 
Alberta -4.84 -6.12 -9.94 -10.92 
BC 3.80 -2.81 0.36 -1.43 
Manitoba -14.15 -15.91 -14.22 -18.62 
New Brunswick -13.04 -0.18 -13.77 -20.01 
New Foundland -13.09 -5.02 -13.35 2.39 
Nova Scotia -17.33 -15.84 -17.84 -19.38 
PEI -19.43 -24.02 -15.69 -30.21 
Quebec -10.96 -14.23 -11.78 -13.96 
Saskatchewan -14.07 -6.33 -15.95 -15.68 
                                                 
6 The grey-shaded coefficients are statistically not significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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 In all the Tables where we report estimated effects of the wage determining 
factors, we report  to show the percentage points change in most coefficients. 
Only exceptions are ‘age’ and ‘age square’ variables, for which we report the 
1exp −φ
β  
coefficient itself. 
College graduates earn 13% more than college dropouts for Canadian males. 
This figure soars up to 18% when compared to high school graduates and 23% to high 
school dropouts. The percentage increases are similar for Canadian females and 
immigrant males and females. Married males of both groups earn more than single men. 
It probably is linked with being more sTable, responsible, and inclined to work hard to 
support family. Canadian males who are married earn 10% more than who are not. Male 
Immigrants who are married earn 6% more than their non-married counterparts. 
Interestingly enough, married females of both groups earn less than single women, 
although not by much. 
Proficiency of immigrant males in official languages, English and/or French, 
assists them earning 12% more than those immigrant males who are not as efficient. 
This supplement is 8% for immigrant females. Canadian men living in metropolitan 
areas earn 8% more than those who live in non-metropolitan areas, but immigrant men 
earn only 2% more when made the same comparison. Canadians, both male and female, 
make more money in Ontario than in all other provinces, with the exception of British 
Columbia. Where Canadians living in BC earn more, immigrants actually are penalised 
for living in the West coast. Living in Newfoundland, on the other hand, is beneficial for 
immigrant females who earn 2% more living in the East coast compared to Canadian 
females’ penalty of 13%. 
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5. A. 1 (b). Earning Function: One Step Procedure 
Table 12 presents the estimated β  coefficients of the one-step method (equation 
5) using OLS, subcategorising Canadians and immigrants into males and females. The 
one-step estimates (actual percentage points) are markedly different, although the 
relative numbers are similar. 
Table 12: Estimated Effects of Wage Determining Factors from One-Step Procedure (Occupation)
ONE STEP OLS MALE FEMALE 
OCCUPATION CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS 
Age 0.071 0.055 0.076 0.052 
Age Square -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
EDUCATION BASE GROUP: COLLEGE GRADUATES 
Some Schooling -31.88 -33.67 -39.36 -34.72 
High School Graduates -25.08 -29.76 -32.87 -29.49 
Some College -18.71 -20.57 -25.53 -21.86 
MARITAL STATUS BASE GROUP: LEGALLY NOT MARRIED 
Legally Married 11.79 7.23 0.88 -1.667
CHILDREN BASE GROUP: NO DEPENDENT CHILD 
Have Dependent Child(ren) 7.79 4.94 -4.45 -1.68 
CITYDWELLERS BASE GROUP: NOT METROPOLITAN CITY RESIDENTS 
City Residents 8.88 2.85 12.79 10.80 
MINORITY STATUS BASE GROUP: NOT VISIBLE MINORITIES 
Visible Minorities -5.73 -18.90 -1.66 -9.70 
FIRST LANGUAGE BASE GROUP: NOT ENGLISH and/or FRENCH 
English and/or French 5.31 14.22 0.85 10.00 
PROVINCE BASE GROUP: ONTARIO 
Alberta -5.45 -6.80 -12.04 -12.22 
BC 3.11 -3.49 -1.58 -2.72 
Manitoba -15.07 -16.99 -15.27 -18.93 
New Brunswick -13.54 0.44 -14.92 -21.60 
New Foundland -13.50 -3.13 -15.56 8.43 
Nova Scotia -18.43 -14.08 -19.42 -20.23 
PEI -21.40 -21.85 -17.85 -27.13 
Quebec -11.50 -14.86 -12.56 -12.81 
Saskatchewan -15.56 -7.23 -18.18 -16.12 
For example, in the two-step method married Canadian men earn 10% more than 
unmarried Canadian males and immigrant males that are married make 6% more than 
                                                 
7 The grey-shaded coefficients are statistically not significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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single men. On the other hand, in the one-step method married Canadian men earn 12% 
more than unmarried Canadian males and immigrant males that are married make 7% 
more than their single counterparts. Comparing other variables also illustrates that even 
though the actual numbers in two procedures are different, they both paint a similar 
picture when we divide the labour force based on occupations.  
One noTable difference in the one-step estimate is that Canadian females also 
earn less in British Columbia than in Ontario. 
5. A. 2 (a). Wage Penalties: Immigrants as a Homogeneous Group  
A small value of  suggests that the wage penalty/reward in immigrant 
occupations is very modest. A larger value suggests a larger penalty/compensation. 
Statistical significance of the estimates is important in this context. Insignificant 
estimates will indicate that there is not enough evidence to suggest that immigrant 
occupations are penalised or rewarded.   
∧φ
Table 13: Estimated Effects of Immigrant Composition on Occupational Income
OCCUPATION     
PIMM CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS 
STEP 1. OLS + STEP 2. WLS -0.29 (0.006) -0.84 (0.053) 
1 STEP PROCEDURE (OLS) -0.26 ***8 (0.189) -0.68 *** (0.210) 
   
OCCUPATION MALE FEMALE 
PIMM CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS
STEP 1. OLS + STEP 2. WLS -0.33 (0.013) -0.80 (0.060) -0.53 (0.023) -1.36 * (0.113) 
1 STEP PROCEDURE (OLS) 0.05 (0.204) -0.39 *** (0.222) 
-1.37 *** 
(0.266) 
-1.63 *** 
(0.250) 
 
Numbers inside the brackets are the 2R  values of the respective regressions. 
                                                 
8 ∗=90% significant, =95% significant, ∗∗ ∗∗∗ =99% significant  
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For immigrant males there is a fairly wide difference in estimates between the 
two procedures. Both two-step and one-step estimate suggests a wage penalty for 
immigrant males in immigrant occupations. The former estimate indicates twice as 
higher a penalty (0.8%) for immigrant males than the one-step estimate does, but it is 
statistically insignificant. The one-step method suggests a penalty of 0.39%, while the 
statistical significance of it is hard to evaluate, since the standard error estimate is 
potentially biased. The estimates for Canadian males are uniformly much smaller than 
their immigrant counterparts. In fact the one-step procedure suggests some potential 
benefits (0.05%), although without any degree of significance. Both procedures suggest 
a significantly large penalty (1.36% and 1.63%) for immigrant females in immigrant 
occupations and both of them are statistically significant, although the level of 
significance varies. Potential penalty (0.53% and 1.37%) as suggested by both the 
methods are smaller for Canadian females in immigrant occupations when compared 
with the penalty for immigrant females.  
We can use an example to elaborate on this. Given an average PIMM of 19.537 
percent (0.19537) for Canadian males, the two-stage estimates of -0.33 for Canadian 
men imply an elasticity of ( =−× }33.0{}19537.0{ ) -0.0644. The same elasticity for the 
one-step estimate is ( =× 05.019537.0 ) 0.0097. 
5. A. 2 (b). Wage Penalties: Non-White Immigrants  
So far we have presented results considering all immigrants are homogeneous. 
Now we distinguish among immigrants according to a wide array of criterion and 
present estimates of the PIMM coefficient for immigrants and Canadians by different 
groupings to provide a full spectrum of results. First, immigrants that were born outside 
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Canada, United States or Europe are grouped together against the rest of the population 
(including immigrants from Europe and United States). We look at the males of both 
these groups to deduce the effect of increase of these immigrants in the labour force in 
Table 14. 
Table 14: Effect of Composition of Non-White Immigrants (Occupation)
OCCUPATION MALE 
PIMM NON-WHITE IMMIGRANTS OTHERS 
1. OLS, 2. WLS -1.59 * (0.116) -1.19 (0.089) 
1 STEP OLS -1.24 *** (0.196) -0.78 *** (0.200) 
 
These percentage points are quite high compared to the results we got when all 
immigrants were considered homogenous. Both two-step and one-step estimates suggest 
that wage penalty for non-white immigrant males in immigrant occupations is higher 
than the penalty paid by other men in the labour force. 
5. A. 2 (c). Wage Penalties: By Year of Immigration  
Next, we categorise immigrants who entered Canada after 1980 against rest of 
the labour force (including immigrants who came prior to 1980) and do the same for 
immigrants who arrived after 1990. Males are our representative group here enabling us 
to compare the effect of such immigrants joining the labour force. 
Table 15: Effect of Composition of Year of Immigration (Occupation)
OCCUPATION MALE MALE 
PIMM 
MIGRATED 
AFTER 1980 OTHERS 
MIGRATED 
AFTER 1990 OTHERS 
1. OLS, 2. WLS -2.18 ** (0.196) -1.59 * (0.114) -4.02 * (0.165) -4.69 ** (0.184) 
1 STEP OLS -1.36 *** (0.217) -0.83 *** (0.203) -4.61 *** (0.205) -3.63 *** (0.209) 
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All the estimates are significant at varying degrees. It is easy to observe that the 
later the immigrants come, the higher the penalty they pay. Or in other words, 
immigrants take a long time to have their income converged with that of Canadians. The 
large percentage points in Table 15 suggest that 15, which most researchers found to be 
the number of years required to have the immigrants’ income converge with Canadians’, 
may not be long enough for the recent cohorts.  
5. A. 2 (d). Wage Penalties: By Age at Immigration  
The next sets of results give indication to if there is any effect of immigrants 
coming in earlier or latter days of their lives. We assemble immigrants who migrated to 
Canada after age 12 against the rest. Similar technique is employed to categorise 
immigrants who migrated after 19, 24, 29, and 39. 
Table 16: Effect of Composition of Age of Immigration (Occupation)
OCCUPATION IMMIGRANT MALES MIGRATED 
PIMM 
AFTER AGE 
12 
AFTER AGE 
19 
AFTER AGE 
24 
AFTER AGE 
29 
AFTER AGE 
39 
1. OLS, 2. WLS -1.00 (0.099) -1.09 (0.087) -1.78 (0.109) 
-3.92 ** 
(0.214) 
-16.05 *** 
(0.331) 
1 STEP OLS 
-0.58 *** 
(0.225) 
-0.64 *** 
(0.243) 
-0.98 *** 
(0.249) 
-2.20 *** 
(0.245) 
-14.80 *** 
(0.249) 
OCCUPATION OTHER MALES 
PIMM 
AFTER AGE 
12 
AFTER AGE 
19 
AFTER AGE 
24 
AFTER AGE 
29 
AFTER AGE 
39 
1. OLS, 2. WLS -0.60 (0.039) -0.60 (0.031) -0.80 (0.029) -1.69 (0.059) 
-10.33 ** 
(0.214) 
1 STEP OLS 
-0.15 *** 
(0.206) 
-0.16 *** 
(0.205) 
-0.26 *** 
(0.207) 
-0.81 *** 
(0.209) 
-7.27 *** 
(0.213) 
 
It is quite obvious from the above results that the earlier (younger) the 
immigrants come to Canada, the better they perform in the labour market. People who 
migrate at 40 years of age or older pay a very large penalty compared to people who 
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migrate after age 12. As discussed earlier, the difference between the one-step and two-
step estimates suggests that the assumption that the residual occupation effects, kη , are 
random may be inappropriate. 
5. B. Industrial Categories 
5. B. 1 (a). Earning Function: Two Step Procedure 
Table 17: Estimated Effects of Wage Determining Factors from Two-Step Procedure (Industry)
1ST STEP OLS MALE FEMALE 
INDUSTRY CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS 
Age 0.062 0.050 0.066 0.045 
Age Square -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
EDUCATION BASE GROUP: COLLEGE GRADUATES 
Some Schooling -31.26 -30.23 -34.92 -31.90 
High School Graduates -24.64 -26.23 -28.88 -25.63 
Some College -18.70 -18.13 -22.49 -18.75 
MARITAL STATUS BASE GROUP: LEGALLY NOT MARRIED 
Legally Married 10.68 6.28 0.91 -1.319
CHILDREN BASE GROUP: NO DEPENDENT CHILD 
Have Dependent Child(ren) 7.27 5.00 -4.71 -2.23 
CITYDWELLERS BASE GROUP: NOT METROPOLITAN CITY RESIDENTS 
City Residents 8.74 2.80 11.55 9.56 
MINORITY STATUS BASE GROUP: NOT VISIBLE MINORITIES 
Visible Minorities -5.02 -18.23 -2.52 -9.58 
FIRST LANGUAGE BASE GROUP: NOT ENGLISH and/or FRENCH 
English and/or French 4.32 12.44 1.17 9.31 
PROVINCE BASE GROUP: ONTARIO 
Alberta -5.19 -6.64 -11.18 -11.64 
BC 3.97 -1.63 -0.04 -1.40 
Manitoba -13.93 -17.82 -15.32 -19.44 
New Brunswick -13.39 -0.01 -14.94 -19.49 
New Foundland -12.82 -0.25 -14.86 5.52 
Nova Scotia -18.06 -13.15 -18.89 -19.71 
PEI -16.71 -18.23 -18.07 -24.36 
Quebec -10.60 -13.70 -12.08 -12.81 
Saskatchewan -13.39 -4.91 -17.14 -15.20 
 
 
                                                 
9 The grey-shaded coefficients are statistically not significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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Table 17 above presents the β  coefficients (equation 1a) of the two-step 
approach for males and females – both Canadians and immigrants – separating the 
labour force into 16 industrial categories.  
As mentioned earlier, equation (1) and equation (1a) are virtually the same 
excepting labour force in equation (1) is categorised according to occupations and 
according to industries in equation (1a). Recall that dummy variables are used for (1) 
education attainment, (2) marital status, (3) having dependent children, (4) visible 
minority status, (5) efficiency in official language(s), (6) living in metropolitan areas 
(CMAs), and (7) province of residence. Canadian males who are college graduates earn 
18% more than college dropouts, 24% more than high school graduates and 31 % more 
than high school dropouts. These rates are similar for Canadian females and immigrant 
males and females. Married males of both groups earn more than single individuals. 
Canadian males who are married earn 10% more than who are not. Male Immigrants 
who are married earn 6% more than their non-married counterparts. Married Canadian 
females earn slightly more than non-married Canadian females but, interestingly 
enough, married immigrant females earn slightly less than those who are single. 
Proficiency in official languages, one or both, assist immigrant males in earning 
12% more than those immigrant males who are not as efficient. This increase is 8% for 
immigrant females. Compensating salary differential for living in metropolitan areas is 
8% more Canadian men, but only 2% more for immigrant men. Of all Canadian males 
those living in B.C. earn the most, where Ontario provides highest income for immigrant 
men. Immigrant females earn 5% more in Newfoundland than in Ontario, compared to 
Canadian females’ penalty of 14%. 
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5. B. 1 (b). Earning Function: One Step Procedure 
Table 18 below presents the estimates of the one-step method (equation 5a) using 
OLS, subcategorising Canadians and immigrants into males and females. Both 
procedures, however, provide similar estimates (percentage points) of the β  
coefficients.  
Table 18: Estimated Effects of Wage Determining Factors from One-Step Procedure (Industry)
ONE STEP OLS MALE FEMALE 
INDUSTRY CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS 
Age 0.070 0.054 0.073 0.051 
Age Square -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
EDUCATION BASE GROUP: COLLEGE GRADUATES 
Some Schooling -31.53 -33.04 -39.01 -35.81 
High School Graduates -24.84 -29.15 -31.95 -28.93 
Some College -18.45 -20.07 -24.96 -21.66 
MARITAL STATUS BASE GROUP: LEGALLY NOT MARRIED 
Legally Married 11.67 7.13 0.96 -1.37 
CHILDREN BASE GROUP: NO DEPENDENT CHILD 
Have Dependent Child(ren) 7.67 4.91 -4.59 -1.83 
CITYDWELLERS BASE GROUP: NOT METROPOLITAN CITY RESIDENTS 
City Residents 9.05 3.28 13.20 11.36 
MINORITY STATUS BASE GROUP: NOT VISIBLE MINORITIES 
Visible Minorities -5.64 -18.66 -1.83 -10.29 
FIRST LANGUAGE BASE GROUP: NOT ENGLISH and/or FRENCH 
English and/or French 5.28 13.81 0.96 11.01 
PROVINCE BASE GROUP: ONTARIO 
Alberta -6.24 -7.50 -12.71 -13.06 
BC 2.72 -3.74 -1.96 -2.58 
Manitoba -15.63 -17.62 -16.32 -20.35 
New Brunswick -14.05 -0.34 -15.83 -22.44 
New Foundland -14.27 -3.49 -16.45 7.17 
Nova Scotia -19.04 -15.24 -20.30 -19.81 
PEI -21.94 -20.92 -19.68 -28.22 
Quebec -11.56 -14.73 -12.76 -12.89 
Saskatchewan -16.39 -7.54 -19.15 -17.53 
 
For example, in the one-step method married Canadian men earn 11% more than 
unmarried Canadian males and immigrant males that are married make 7% more than 
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their single counterparts. In the two-step method these numbers are 10% and 6% 
respectively. Comparing other variables also illustrates that even though the actual 
numbers in one-step and two-step procedures are different, they both paint a similar 
picture when the labour force is categorised according to the industries they work in. 
5. B. 2 (a). Wage Penalties: Immigrants as a Homogeneous Group 
Our main objective is to look for whether there is enough evidence to suggest 
that immigrant industries are categorically penalised or rewarded.   
Table 19: Estimated Effects of Immigrant Composition on Industrial Income
INDUSTRY   
PIMM CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS
STEP 1. OLS + STEP 2. WLS -0.91 (0.081)  -1.13 (0.161) 
1 STEP PROCEDURE (OLS) 
-0.90 *** 
(0.196) -1.04 *** (0.215) 
   
INDUSTRY MALE FEMALE
PIMM CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS CANADIANS IMMIGRANTS
STEP 1. OLS + STEP 2. WLS -0.68 (0.065) -1.05 (0.160) -1.28 * (0.211) 
-1.81 ***  
(0.431) 
1 STEP PROCEDURE (OLS) 
-0.44 *** 
(0.206) -0.84 *** (0.226) 
-1.58 *** 
(0.275) 
-1.72 *** 
(0.251) 
 
Again, a small value of  suggests that the wage penalty/reward in immigrant 
industries is very modest and a larger value suggests a larger penalty/compensation. 
Statistical significance of the estimates is important in this context. 
∧φ
For immigrant males there is a fairly wide difference in estimates between the 
two procedures. Both two-step and one-step estimates suggest a wage penalty for 
immigrant males in immigrant jobs. The two-step estimate indicates a penalty of 1.05% 
for immigrant males, but it is statistically insignificant. The one-step estimate suggests a 
penalty of 0.84%, while the statistical significance of it is hard to evaluate since the 
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standard error estimate is potentially biased. The penalty that the Canadian males pay 
(0.68% or 0.44%) is uniformly much smaller than that of immigrant men and the two-
step estimate is statistically insignificant. Both procedures suggest a significantly large 
penalty (1.81% or 1.72%) for immigrant females in immigrant jobs and both of them are 
statistically significant. For Canadian females potential penalty as suggested by both the 
methods (1.28% or 1.58%) is smaller compared to that of immigrant females.  
We can use an example to elaborate on this. Given an average PIMM of 19.294 
percent (0.19294) for Canadian males, the two-stage estimates of -0.68 for Canadian 
men imply an elasticity of ( =−× }68.0{}19294.0{ ) -0.1311. The same elasticity for the 
one-step estimate is ( =−× }44.0{}19294.0{ ) -0.0848. 
5. B. 2 (b). Wage Penalties: Non-White Immigrants 
So far we have presented results considering all immigrants are homogeneous. 
Now we distinguish among immigrants according to a wide array of criterion and 
present estimates of  for immigrants and Canadians by different groupings to provide a 
full spectrum of results. First, immigrants that were born outside Canada, United States 
or Europe are grouped together against the rest of the population (including immigrants 
from Europe and United States). We focus on the males of both these groups as a 
reference point to evaluate the effect of these non-white immigrants in Table 20. 
∧φ
Table 20: Effect of Composition of Non-White Immigrants (Industry)
INDUSTRY MALE
PIMM NON-WHITE IMMIGRANTS OTHERS
STEP 1. OLS + STEP 2. WLS -2.35 ** (0.302) 
-1.81 
(0.156) 
1 STEP PROCEDURE (OLS) -2.01 *** (0.204) 
-1.37 *** 
(0.203) 
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These results are quite high compared to the results we got when all immigrants 
were considered homogenous. Both two-step and one-step estimates suggest statistically 
significant wage penalty for non-white immigrant males in immigrant jobs that is higher 
than the penalty paid by other men in the labour force. 
5. B. 2 (c). Wage Penalties: By Year of Immigration 
  Next, we categorise immigrants who entered Canada after 1980 against the rest 
of the labour force (including immigrants who came prior to 1980) and do the same for 
immigrants who arrived after 1990. Males are our representative group here as well, 
enabling us to compare the effect of earlier and subsequent cohorts of immigrants.   
Table 21: Effect of Composition of Year of Immigration (Industry)
INDUSTRY MALE MALE
PIMM MIGRATED AFTER 1980 OTHERS MIGRATED AFTER 1990 OTHERS
1. OLS + 2. WLS -2.25 ** (0.312) 
-1.62 
(0.134) -5.88 *** (0.454) 
-5.09 * 
(0.220) 
1 STEP OLS -1.79 *** (0.219) 
-1.24 *** 
(0.206) -5.36 *** (0.207) 
-4.42 *** 
(0.213) 
 
All the one-step estimates are at least 99% significant and all but one of the two-
step estimates are significant themselves, although to a varying degree.    
It is easy to observe that the later the immigrants come, the higher the penalty 
they pay. Or in other words, immigrants take a long time to have their income converged 
with that of Canadians. The penalty for males of the rest of the labour force is uniformly 
smaller than their immigrant counterparts at every comparable age. Expectedly, these 
estimates are much higher than when all immigrants were considered homogeneous. 
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5. B. 2 (d). Wage Penalties: By Age at Immigration 
The next sets of results give indication to if there is any effect of the age at which 
immigrants enter Canada. We assemble immigrants who migrated to Canada after age 
12 against the rest. We focus on the males of both these groups as a reference point to 
evaluate the effect of age of immigration in Table 22. Similar technique is employed to 
categorise immigrants who migrated after the age of 19, 24, 29, and 39. 
Table 22: Effect of Composition of Age of Immigration (Industry)
INDUSTRY IMMIGRANT MALES MIGRATED 
PIMM
AFTER AGE 
12
AFTER AGE 
19
AFTER AGE 
24
AFTER AGE 
29
AFTER AGE 
39
1. OLS + 2. WLS -1.16 (0.177) -1.30 (0.163) -1.90 (0.157) -3.20 (0.152) 
-17.93 *** 
(0.489) 
1 STEP OLS 
-0.91 *** 
(0.228) 
-0.97 *** 
(0.245) 
-1.37 *** 
(0.251) 
-2.25 *** 
(0.244) 
-17.50 *** 
(0.250) 
INDUSTRY OTHER MALES
PIMM
AFTER AGE 
12
AFTER AGE 
19
AFTER AGE 
24
AFTER AGE 
29
AFTER AGE 
39
1. OLS + 2. WLS -0.74 (0.071) -0.91 (0.075) -1.26 (0.078) -2.28 (0.100) 
-13.00 ** 
(0.320) 
1 STEP OLS 
-0.46 *** 
(0.208) 
-0.55 *** 
(0.207) 
-0.78 *** 
(0.209) 
-1.54 *** 
(0.211) 
-12.03 *** 
(0.223) 
 
It is quite obvious from the above results that the earlier (younger) the 
immigrants come to Canada, the better they perform in the labour market. People who 
migrated when 40 years of age or older pay a very large and statistically significant 
penalty (17.93% or 17.50%), whereas people who migrated between age 12 and age 39 
counterbalance this penalty to almost next to nothing (1.16% or 0.91%).  
 
 
 
 
 59
  
CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
Analysis of the effect of immigrant composition on income in Canada has 
uncovered some remarkable particulars. Estimates of the relationship between income 
and immigrant composition can be sensitive to the choice of estimation strategy and the 
inclusion of any additional control variables. Although there is some heterogeneity 
across subgroups, most estimates for Canadians are quite modest and typically 
statistically insignificant. The estimates for immigrants, however, are uniformly 
negative, revealing a more substantial penalty for work in immigrant jobs. 
Analysis at finer levels of aggregation reveals some heterogeneity in the penalty 
across groups. In narrower specifications, immigrants who originated from places other 
than Europe and the United States face significant penalties to working in immigrant 
jobs relative to co-workers in Canadian jobs. Larger negative penalties are also found for 
immigrants who have not been in Canada for a very significant period of time. 
Immigrants who enter Canada at an older age face massive penalties to working in 
immigrant jobs. Immigration at an earlier age reduces this penalty considerably and 
childhood immigration almost dissolves any penalty to be had. The corresponding 
penalties for Canadians are more uniform across the different subgroup specifications 
and decomposition of the data. 
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 There is no pay equity legislation in place for the betterment of immigrants in 
Canada and this study can shade some lights as to whether there is a need for one. Pay 
equity programs for women have been introduced to the public sectors of most 
provinces, the private sector of Ontario, and more recently the private sector of Quebec. 
Pay equity programs for immigrants, if that was ever to be put in place, can gain some 
perspective from the female pay equity legislation on the ‘target’ for these initiatives, as 
well as any further extensions of comparable worth. 
The aggregate relationship of income with immigrant composition could 
typically be a rallying point for advocates of pay equity legislation. Our results suggest 
that for immigrants this aggregate relationship is fairly small, unless they are 
subcategorised into specific groups (e.g. non-white immigrants, immigration after 1990). 
A simulation of the contribution of occupational and industrial immigrant segregation to 
the aggregate immigrant wage differential is correspondingly quite modest. This raises 
the question whether a universal pay equity program would provide widespread benefits 
to immigrants. 
There are at least two important caveats to these conclusions. First, our results do 
not preclude the existence of low-paid immigrant occupations or industries, such as 
chefs and cooks, supervisors, and other occupations in food and beverage service and 
childcare and home support workers; accommodation, food and beverage services 
industry. However, there are some immigrants who are likewise low paid in mixed and 
Canadian occupations and industries: Retail trade supervisors, salespersons, sales clerks 
and cashiers; retail trade industry (mixed), and occupations unique to primary industries, 
agriculture industry (Canadian). More important, some immigrants hold immigrant jobs 
that are relatively highly paid, such as Supervisors, machine operators and assemblers in 
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manufacturing; jobs in the manufacturing industry. As a result, the immigrant 
composition of employment does not have strong consequence for the low pay of 
immigrants at the aggregate level. That is, immigrants are not low paid because and only 
when they work in immigrant jobs. Immigrants working in immigrant jobs are not at a 
larger disadvantage relative to their Canadian counterparts than immigrants working in 
mixed and Canadian jobs. If there is a ‘systematic’ discrimination in the labour market, 
it is against all immigrants, not just against immigrants in immigrant jobs. 
Second, we do find significant penalties to immigrant work for Canadians, and 
more so when immigrants are categorised with a rigid classification. Therefore, the 
potential impact of selective pay equity programs may be greater for these individuals. 
As is true in many previous studies of comparable worth programs, these predictions are 
simulations and speculation based on inference from ‘pre-legislation’ labour market. 
Further study into the reasons why many immigrant jobs in Canada do not attract a 
sizeable income penalty remain important topics for future research. 
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 Appendix 
 
Immigrant Occupations 
1. Chefs and cooks, supervisors, and other occupations in food and beverage service 
2. Childcare and home support workers 
3. Service supervisors, occupations in travel and accommodation, attendants in recreation and sport 
and sales and service occupations 
4. Supervisors, machine operators and assemblers in manufacturing 
5. Labourers in processing, manufacturing and utilities 
Mixed Occupations
1. Senior management occupations   
2. Other management occupations  
3. Professional occupations in business and Finance 
4. Financial, secretarial and administrative occupations 
5. Clerical occupations and clerical supervisors 
6. Occupations in natural and applied sciences 
7. Professional occupations in health, registered nurses and supervisors 
8. Technical, assisting and related occupations in health 
9. Occupations in social science, government services and religion 
10. Teachers and professors   
11. Occupations in art, culture, recreation and sport 
12. Wholesale, technical, insurance, real estate sales specialists, and retail, wholesale and grain 
buyers 
13. Retail trade supervisors, salespersons, sales clerks and cashiers 
14. Contractors and supervisors in trades and transportation 
15. Construction trades 
16. Other trades occupations 
17. Trades helpers, construction, and transportation labourers and related occupations 
Canadian Occupations
1. Occupations in protective services 
2. Transport and equipment operators 
3. Occupations unique to primary industries 
Immigrant Industries 
1. Manufacturing 
2. Accommodation, food and beverage services 
Mixed Industries
1. Construction 
2. Transportation and storage 
3. Wholesale trade  
4. Retail trade 
5. Finance, insurance and real estate 
6. Business services 
7. Educational services 
8. Health and social services 
9. Other services 
Canadian Industries 
1. Agriculture 
2. Other primary industries 
3. Communication and other utilities 
4. Government services: Federal 
5. Government services: Other 
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